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Abstract 
The school history textbook is gaining critical scholarly attention globally as a 
contested medium of conflicting ideologies and interests. At issue are the roles and 
the consequences of education and textbooks in influencing the ethos of future 
citizens. The Russian Federation and Japan are two nations that continue to receive 
strong criticism over their history textbooks from international and domestic critics 
for using them to legitimise the ruling government, rather than to foster critical 
understanding of the past. At the same time, both nations equally face criticism 
from rightist groups in their own countries for not using history textbooks well 
enough to legitimise the ruling elites, state power and to promote patriotism. This 
article provides comparative analyses of narrative strategies and ideologies used in 
44 history textbooks, 22 from each country, approved by Russian and Japanese 
Ministries of Education between 1997 and 2010. Under scrutiny are the causes, the 
course and the consequences of the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05), the first 
military conflict of the 20th century, where the interests of major political players, 
the United States, Britain, France, Russia and Japan collided. The main question is 
how do the narratives of the Russo-Japanese War that students are exposed to at 
school today reflect the different current readings of histories in each nation?   
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Although our research is about history textbooks, the issue is about history and its impact on 
contemporary societies. Russia and Japan are making steps towards replacing a decades-old 
territorial dispute that has held up the signing of a Japan-Russia peace treaty with constructive 
dialogue. Since taking office in December 2012, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has met 
with Russian President Vladimir Putin five times. Abe even accepted Putin’s invitation to 
attend the opening ceremony for the Sochi Olympic Games in February 2014, which was 
boycotted by the majority of Western leaders who justified their decision by the poor record of 
human rights in Russia. Japan attracts Russian attention as Moscow is looking for outside 
investments to develop its resource-rich but underpopulated Siberian and far eastern regions. 
Japan is equally interested, especially after the nuclear disaster at the Fukushima Daiichi 
nuclear plant in March 2011, in Russian energy suppliers, such as liquefied natural gas and 
coal. In addition to the economic interests, as Japan experiences increasingly tense relations 
with China, Tokyo also tries to distract Russia from developing stronger ties with Beijing in 
order to influence a rapidly developing new geopolitical order in Asia-Pacific. This cannot be 
achieved without further cooperation between Japan and Russia.  These political ambitions of 
the national leaders are easier to realise and achieve when public opinion or public views of the 
‘other’ nation are positive or at least sympathetic. However, it is right to say that the attitude of 
Japanese society towards Russia and vice versa demonstrates neither pure confrontation nor 
empathetic understanding. 
 The lack of mutual understanding between Russia and Japan lies not only in some 
thorny issues of the past dominated by the territorial disputes of the Kurile Islands, as they are 
called in Russia, or Hoppô Ryodô in Japan (‘Northern territories’), but even more so in ways 
how historical events that resulted in mutual conflicts are narrated and presented to the public 
today. History textbooks contribute towards constructing public knowledge and public opinion 
about a nations’ own past, and they equally contribute towards constructing images of other 
nations. 
It is possible to argue that history textbooks undoubtedly have their limitations as a 
medium of historical knowledge. Today, with the wide spread of the images of the past through, 
first of all, various forms of popular culture due to ever developing new technologies, it is hard 
to imagine that history textbook can be anyone’s, and particularly young people’s, favourite 
pastime. However, children in Japan and Russia get exposed to the history textbook’s narrative 
at the young age when they first develop their understanding of the world. History textbooks 
bear immutable authority on young readers who are often not prepared or simply do not know 
how to challenge the version of official history introduced at school1.   History curricula 
certainly matter in this context.  Zheng Wang, in his analysis of Chinese history textbooks in 
recent decades, maintains “that to understand a country, one should visit the country’s primary 
schools and high schools and read their history textbooks.”2  If Wang is correct, his observation 
reinforces our argument that history textbooks serve as a medium that can influence a nation’s 
youths in forming perceptions about other countries as well as their own. His caveat underlines 
often reported tensions between Japan and its East Asian neighbours, particularly China and 
Korea. Arguably by extending the geographical parameters of Wang's model, Russia, the 
nation immediately to the west and north of Japan, can be included in this narrative of 'East 
Asia' too.    
Indeed, textbook analysis makes an interesting field of study and is attracting growing 
academic attention. Recently scholars follow interdisciplinary approaches and analyse the 
textbook content from various disciplinary angles including sociological models, curriculum 
policies, linguistics and historiography.  A recent call for creating a historiography of history 
textbooks is a consequence of these interdisciplinary endeavours.3 Elefherios Klerides argues 
that the new approach towards analysing textbooks should include the textbook as discourse 
and the textbook as a genre.4 He identifies three types of textbooks according to textbook 
genre. The traditional history textbooks based on a concept of history as accepted truth. The 
aim of such textbooks is to construct subjects loyal to the nation state. It is expected the readers 
uncritically absorb and accept the textbook’s content. The new history textbook’s genre 
produces texts that teach to think about ‘how’ history evolves rather than ‘what’ happened. 
Students who use these textbooks have the potential to become active learners engaged in 
constructing knowledge about ‘the past’.5 The author reveals that the majority of textbook 
writers intend to mix up these two genres. We will attempt to assess how Japanese and Russian 
textbooks fit in into Klerides’s analysis of textbooks genres. Furthermore, comparative analysis 
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of textbooks from more than one country of origin complements the multi-faceted nature of 
textbook analysis. Cross-national comparisons can shed light on the commonalities and 
differences in textual representation of history and inform us about the common strategies that 
textbooks use in conveying officially sanctioned narratives. We do not assume that every word 
and every piece of overt or covert ideology in texts and curricula would be faithfully 
transplanted from the textbook to students via teachers. This is a question that teachers are best 
equipped to probe. The focus of this paper is on textbook narratives.  
This paper will start with introducing methodological framework for choosing 
particular textbooks for the analysis of Russo-Japanese War narratives. The next section 
provides short historiographical context of the Russo-Japanese War. It is followed by the 
analysis of the didactic messages to children about the war following the causes, the course and 
the conclusion of the war as it is presented in 44 selected history textbooks. The underpinning 
question behind the analysis of the war is the importance of nationalism in framing national 
histories, particular of conflict. The main argument is about how different nations read the 
same historical event differently and how within those nations the historical narratives and 
emphases are also different, and hinge upon the political orientation of those currently in 
power. We will conclude by answering the question about how the past is manipulated and 
constructed in the history textbooks to fit contemporary narratives.   
 
Sampling and Methodology  
For all students in Japan, the study of history at middle-school (thirteen to fifteen years old) is 
compulsory. Thus it is here that the greatest exposure to textbook versions of history occurs. 
The curriculum documents used over the 1997-2010 period feature the Russo-Japan War under 
a section on Japan’s modernisation and rise in international standing during the Meiji era.6 
Japan’s Ministry of Education insist on screening prospective textbooks against the curriculum 
and numerous criteria prior to granting official approval and publication. The screening rounds 
took place in 1997, 2002 and 2007. A total of 22 textbooks were approved between 1997 and 
																																								 																				
6 Curriculum revisions are made almost every ten years with a few years of lead-in to allow for textbook revision. 
The textbooks examined were published when two curricula were in effect; each was implemented in 1993 and 
2002. In 2008 a new curriculum was announced for implementation in the 2012 academic year. The three 
curricula are available on the Japanese Education Ministry’s website. Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, 
Science and Technology (Japan), “Gakushû shidô yôryô” [Course of Studies]. 
http://www.mext.go.jp/a_menu/shotou/youryou/main4_a2.htm, accessed 5 January 2013. 
2010. The revision of the curriculum which provides the basis for textbooks happens less 
frequently.7  
In Russia the textbook approval by the Ministry of Education happens annually, which 
is different from the four year approval cycle in Japan. Establishing an exact parallel between 
Japanese and Russian textbooks proved difficult because history is taught at different ages. The 
Russian curriculum covers the war mostly in the last two years (Years 10 and 11), age 16-17, 
of the high school curriculum with some exceptions in the last two years of the intermediate 
school syllabus in Years 8 and  9, age 14 and 15.8 In intermediate school the Russo-Japanese 
War is included in textbooks on Russian history and World history and in the high school it is 
included in the textbooks on “Russia and the World”. This age group is slightly higher than in 
Japan, where the children exposed to these textbooks will be between 13 and 15 years of age.  
Similar to the Japanese sample we have selected also 22 textbooks published during 
1997-2010 based on how they represented the Russo-Japanese War.9 The selected textbooks all 
include substantive descriptions of the War, from a few paragraphs to two or three pages. In a 
number of cases textbooks by the same authors were chosen to determine any changes in the 
narrative. All of the textbooks but one were approved by the Ministry of Education and proved 
to be popular in schools10.  
The period 1997-2010 was determined by the growing attention to History education in 
both countries that followed the end of the Shôwa period (1989) and the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union (1992). In Japan the extant debates on the treatment of the country’s imperial past 
intensified, and continued to afflict relations with its East Asian neighbours. Crystallising the 
neo-nationalist resurgence was the inception of Atarashii rekishi kyôkasho o tsukurukai in 
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1996 (Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform, hereafter Tsukurukai). The group 
criticized Japanese history textbooks for making excessive references to Japan’s wartime 
responsibility and as a result of this presenting an ‘apologetic’ history to Japanese youth. 
According to Tsukurukai school textbooks should instill pride in national history amongst the 
youth.11 A second time Prime Minister Abe Shinzô echoed the sentiments of Tsukurukai even 
before his first premiership in 2006: “The purpose of education is to develop people with 
ambitions and to create a nation with dignity. It is the state’s task to revive education.”12 
Critics, whose orientation is rooted in the peace education of the early postwar years, charge 
that Tsukurukai and their sympathisers endorse the state-centred education, and their vision is 
inimical to the rights of teachers and students as citizens, and Japan’s relations with ethnic 
minorities and neighbouring nations.  
 In Russia a similar turn towards nationalism and patriotic education accompanies the 
recent search for post-Soviet and post-Cold War statehood. Vladimir Putin, whose reign as 
President or Prime Minister continues since his appointment as Acting President by Boris 
Yeltsin on 31 December 1999, makes an effort to revive Russian identity and strengthen 
Russian nationalism through history education by correcting liberal mistakes made by 
perestroika and glasnost in the late 1980s and early 1990s.13  Unshackled from the orthodoxy 
of the state-authored textbook The Concise History of the USSR, first published in 1937, in the 
1990s numerous textbooks sought to present hitherto suppressed alternative historical visions 
and pedagogy.14 However, the will of the writers and publishers did not match the teachers’ 
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readiness to embrace the new intellectual, historiographical and pedagogical paradigm.15 Public 
debate on history textbooks began soon after Putin directly intervened to use history education 
to restore patriotism amongst national youth in the early 2000s. It continues in Russia today, 
and while the possibility of a return to a single textbook – as in 1937 – exists, it has not yet 
occurred16.  
In Russia the main history battles revolve around the interpretation of the Soviet era, 
the role and place of Stalin and Stalin’s era in Russian history and the interpretation of the 
Second World War. At the core of this debate is the question about the meaning of historical 
knowledge and the role of history education which determines the character of history 
textbooks. The notion that “history is always partisan, it is always value-laden” as stated in the 
Materials for Discussion on the New Concept of History Teaching of the Department of 
History of the Russian Academy of Science prevails among Russian textbook authors.17 Hence 
since the beginning of 2001, history education has been guided by the government programme 
of patriotic education, with government authorities exercising their power to shape the contents 
of textbooks.18 Patriotic education in this context means education that promotes the 
unquestionable authority of the Russian state and insists on instilling pride in national history 
among Russian youth, a motivation it shares with Tsukurukai. Although Russia does not have 
an official counterpart to Tsukurukai, the Russian President and certain politicians exercise 
their power to influence directly the Ministry of Education (MOE). The difference between 
Japan and Russia is that Japan has a strong opposition to Tsukurukai’s attempts to revise 
history, while in Russia the President’s voice silences any alternative views. 1997/98 were 
equally important for Russian history textbooks as they marked the turning away from a liberal 
period characterised by the perestroika and glasnost of Mikhail Gorbachev in the second half of 
the 1980s, towards a re-centralised and even ‘counter-reformed’ history education.19   
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While the context for the emergence of state intervention into history is different in the 
two countries, they share a similar tradition of history writing based on a positivist approach 
that historical truth should be based on accurate historical facts. In Russia this ‘factocentrism’ 
seems to contribute to, and not necessarily contradict, the long tradition of understanding 
history through the lenses of historical materialism, which holds that theory or ideology 
precedes history. In the 1990s many Russian historians embarked on rewriting history by 
adding new factual knowledge, believing that history can be represented objectively through 
the ‘right’ facts20. The desire for constructing one ‘universal’ textbook in Russia that will be 
factually accurate and convey ‘historical truth’ can be understood in the context of this 
traditional belief in the power of factual knowledge.    
Japan, and to a lesser extent Russia, have been exposed in recently years to postmodern 
and poststructuralist ideas that historical narratives are constructed and contestable. 21 However, 
this postmodern approach to writing history does not really effect the descriptions of the 
Russo-Japanese War in the history textbooks of both nations, as our analysis will reveal.        
We use discourse analysis to analyse textbooks through the three stages of the war: the 
lead up, conflict phase, and conclusion. This method allows us to interpret the language of 
textbooks as it is situated in a socio-historic context.  
 
The Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905, a historiographical note  
Numerous academic historians devote themselves to narrating the causes, the course and 
ramifications of the Russo-Japanese War. Consensus among Japanese and Russian academics 
is that the immediate cause of the war was the breakdown in negotiations intended to resolve 
their rivalry over the Korean Peninsula and Manchuria. The Japanese government opted for, 
though not unanimously, the ‘Man-Kan’ exchange whereby Japan conceded the Russian 
predominance over Manchuria in exchange for Russia accepting the Japanese dominance of 
Korea. Negotiations between Japan and Russia in 1903 and 1904 only seemed to cultivate 
mutual mistrust. In February 1904 Japan broke off its diplomatic ties with Russia and declared 
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war.22 During the conflict both Japan and Russia experienced high casualties. Although the 
Japanese won several key land and naval battles these came at a greater human and financial 
cost than the Sino-Japanese war ten years earlier. Meanwhile, the Tsarist regime grew anxious 
about growing public dissent aroused by the war, which would eventually culminate in the 
First Russian Revolution of 1905-07. The Portsmouth Treaty in 1905, presided over by 
American President Theodore Roosevelt, concluded the war. Amongst other things, the 
Japanese secured their hold over Korea. But the absence of any reparations from Russia 
angered the Japanese public whose lives had been constrained by inflation and tax increases to 
fund war. The centenary of the war spurred attempts for new interpretations in both countries. 
As the historian Katô Yôko reports, recent trends in Japan point towards global and regional 
perspectives of Western Imperialism and Korean and Chinese resistance to the war. More 
historians also emphasise the diplomatic efforts by Japan and Russia to avert war.23  
 
In Japan Katsuoka Kanji and his team ‘The Association of Parliamentarians to Analyse 
World History Textbooks’ (Sekai no rekishi kyôkasho o kangaeru giin renmei) conduct content 
analysis of the Russo-Japan War. His team compares Japanese wartime textbooks and current 
textbooks, and also uses a small sample from Russia, and East and Southeast Asia. Katsuoka’s 
team found that the current Japanese texts portray the Japanese state as the overall culprit in the 
war, and omit the heroic achievements of Japanese military officers. The researchers find such 
depictions to be distorting or deleting historical truth, which falls short of the expectations of 
patriotic education. They refer to the prewar textbooks as the model that contemporary texts 
should emulate to fulfil such a role.24  
  
While valuable, Katsuoka’s and his colleague’s analysis illuminates three 
shortcomings. First, the number of the sampled recent Japanese and Russian textbooks is too 
small to identify a general trend. The researchers cite the Tsukurukai textbook as the only text 
devoting adequate space to achieve the goal of instilling patriotism. Second, although  bi-
national comparisons may not be their original intention, the analysis of Russian texts is brief 
and concludes that the present texts replicate the Soviet historiography of blaming Japan and 
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Wars] (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2007), 204-225. 
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24 Katsuoka Kanji, Kyôkasho kara mita nichiro sensô: Kore de iinoka nichiro senesô [The Russo-Japan War 
viewed from textbooks: Are the current textbooks appropriate?] (Tokyo: Teneisha, 2004). 
exculpating Russia. In contrast with Katsuoka’s analysis this project analyses a larger number 
of textbooks from both nations (22 textbooks from each country), attempting a systematic 
discourse analysis of their descriptions of the Russo-Japanese war and defining important 
nuances in textbook narratives.  
Gennadii Bordugov and Min Gyon Hyon in their analysis of Japan’s representation in 
Russian history textbooks published during the same period discussed in this paper, conclude 
that the authors of more liberal textbooks present Russian loss in this war as less dramatic, and 
also these authors do not connect the Russian loss with the beginning of the 1905 Russian 
revolution.25 In more conservative textbooks, according to Bordugov and Min Gyon Hyon, the 
1905 Russian revolution was the main reason for Russian loss in this war.  The absence of 
agreement about the war among members of the Russian political elite resulted in a lack of war 
support and Russia finally lost to Japan.26 The authors analysed 27 Russian history textbooks in 
total but the analysis of the Russo-Japanese war occupies a very small part in their article.  
English-speaking scholars branch off from military and diplomatic history and into 
cultural and social responses to the war.27 The Soviet-era historiography presented the war 
from military and diplomatic angles – often criticising the putative incompetence of the Tsarist 
regime and its military strategists.28 The centenary marked a departure from the Soviet-era 
paradigm. New works opened up socio-cultural dimensions, incorporating public voices 
including the intelligentsia, soldiers and their families, and journalists. Russian historians 
showed particular interest in the work of the secret services in both countries and recognised 
Japan’s superiority on this front.29  
The beginning of the Russo-Japanese war in Japanese textbooks: War by popular 
demand 
																																								 																				
25 Bordugov Gennadii A. & Min Gyon Hyon, Yaponiya v zerkale rossiiskih shkolnyuh uchebnikov po istorii 
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123    
26 Ibid.	
27 See for instance, Sandra Wilson, “The Russo-Japanese War and Japan: Politics, Nationalism and Historical 
Memory,” in The Russo-Japanese War in Cultural Perspective, 1904-05, eds. Sandra Wilson and David Wells 
(Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1999). 160-193. 
28 Shirokograd, Yaponia. 
29 Dimitri B. Pavlov, Russko-yaponskaya voina 1904-1905: Sekretnyue operatsii na sushe i na more [The Russo-
Japanese War 1904-05: Secret Operations on the Land and in the Sea] (Moscow: Materik, 2004) and Alexi V. 
Shishov, Neizvestnyue stranistyu russko-yaponskoi voinyu [Unknown Pages of the Russo-Japanese War] 
(Moscow: Veche, 2004). 
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Exploring the explanations for the beginning of the war is worthwhile as it illuminates who 
was considered responsible for its outbreak. All 22 Japanese textbooks cite popular support as 
a key factor. The 1997 edition of the textbook by Shimizu Shoin tells us:  
Within Japan, voices calling for war with Russia began to emerge. Although Christian 
Uchimura Kanzô and Socialist Kôtokuu Shûsui maintained pacifist (anti-war) 
arguments, the public opinion inside the nation leaned towards the pro-war camp. In 
1904 Japan declared war on Russia, and the Russo-Japanese War began.30 
While the text clearly says Japan declared war on Russia, the sequence of the sentences 
suggests that the government did the public a favour by responding to its jingoistic sentiments. 
The textbook seems to suggest the conflict began due to public demand, obscuring the 
government’s role in the declaration of war.  
This explanation is also found elsewhere. The 1997 edition by Kyôiku Shuppan 
(publisher) describes how: “Inside Japan, the voices appealing for war gained force suddenly, 
and overwhelmed the cautious approach [in dealing with the Russians] and Pacifists.” 31 
Although the text says the pro-war voice ‘suddenly’ began to dominate, it makes no attempt to 
explain this development. The text also assumes that its ascendancy was sufficient in 
‘overwhelming’ the cautious approach; yet we do not know how and why the sudden change 
occurred, or who could have been responsible for it. Three editions by Nihon Bunkyô Shuppan 
replicate this explanation. For instance, the 2006 edition says:                                
Japan, pro-war and anti-war voices arose. However, owing to antagonism towards 
Russia following the Triple Intervention, the pro-war voice gained strength. Once the 
[Russo-Japanese] war began, Ôtsu Kusuoko and Yosano Akiko, from female 
perspectives, wrote poems deploring the war.                                                                                                                            
 
In February 1904 Japan declared war on Russia; the Russo-Japanese War began.32 
 
Although these texts point out pacifist opposition, the explanation of ‘war by popular demand’ 
still remains. The textbooks hint at the possibility of pacifism, but do not highlight the choice 
																																								 																				
30 Mayuzumi Hiromichi and 11 others, Nihon no rekishi to sekai: Chigakkô rekishi [Japan’s History and the 
World: Middle-school History] (Tokyo: Shimizu shoin, 1997), 214. Japanese textbooks are compiled by teams 
comprising numerous authors. For the sake of convenience the main text refers the Japanese textbooks by the 
publishers’ names. 
31 Sasayama Haruo and 41 others, Chûgaku shakai: Rekishi [Middle School Social Studies: History] (Tokyo: 
Kyôiku shuppan, 1997), 208. 
32 Ôhama Tetsuya and 10 others, Chûgakusei no shakaika nihon no ayumi to sekai: Rekishi [Social Studies for 
Middle-school Students Japan’s Footsteps and the World: History] (Osaka: Nihon bunkyô shuppan, 2006), 139.  
the government had between declaring war or pursuing diplomatic solutions to avert it.33 
Contrary to these textbooks, the two editions by Tsukurukai narrate how:  
Russia, which had a national budget and military capacity ten times larger than those of 
Japan, had reinforced the troops in Manchu, and constructed military bases in northern 
Korea. If these had continued unchecked, it would have been patently clear that 
Russia’s military power would have been so strong that Japan could not meet the 
challenge. The cabinet was afraid of leaving it until too late, and resolved to initiate the 
war with Russia.  
 
In February 1904, Japan announced the termination of diplomatic relations with Russia, 
which marked the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War.34 
 
These textbooks accentuate the geopolitical circumstances surrounding Japan. They 
foreshadow the Japanese declaration of war on Russia as a defensive act rather than an act of 
aggression by the Japanese military or the cabinet’s opportunism. 
The beginning of Russo-Japanese war in Russian textbooks: The war begins by Japanese 
aggression  
In contrast to Japanese textbooks, and especially the Tsukurukai one, Alexander Chubaryan’s 
textbook portrays Japan as a threat:  
The war was caused by the conflict of interests of two counties in the Far East. Japan, 
after the successful reforms of the Meiji revolution, was better prepared for the military 
conflict with Russia who stopped half way with its reforms. Some circles close to the 
Tsar did not understand the danger of the potential military collision with Japan but, 
quite the opposite, tried to encourage the conflict and believed that ‘the small and 
victorious war’ with Japan would bring together the Russian public and strengthen the 
monarchy. This was an important factor if negotiations between the two countries were 
sabotaged.35 
 
He also adds another dimension: the ignorance of the Tsarist regime about the region, and its 
underestimation of Japanese capabilities. Some close to the Tsarist circles Chubaryan notes, 
																																								 																				
33 Kuroda Hideo and seven others, Shakaika chûgakkô no rekishi: Nihon no ayumi to sekai no ugoki (Saishin ban) 
[Middle-School Social Studies History: Footsteps of Japan and of the World] (Tokyo: Teikoku shoin, 2002), 168, 
and Kuroda Hideo and seven others, Shakaika chûgakusei no rekishi: nihon no ayumi to sekai ugoki (shotei ban) 
[Middle-School Social Studies History: Footsteps of Japan and of the World (First edition)] (Tokyo: Teikoku 
shoin, 2006), 172. 
34 Nishio Kanji and 13 others, Chugaku shakai atarashii rekishi kyôkasho [Middle-School Social Studies New 
History] (Tokyo: Fusôsha, 2002), 222, and Fujioka Nobukatsu and 11 others, Chugaku shakai kaitei ban atarashii 
rekishi kyôkasho [New History Textbook: Revised Middle-School Social Studies] (Tokyo: Fusôsha, 2006), 166-
167. The 2006 edition adds that the Japan declared war on the back of support from America and Britain. Ibid., 
167. 
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also saw the war with Japan as an opportunity to revive the flagging popularity of Imperial 
rule. The sabotaging of the negotiations, as we are told, was not a one-sided affair.  
 
Nikita Zagladin’s textbook, the winner of the first Ministry of Education competition 
on modern Russian history textbooks in 2002, describes the precipitating events quite 
differently from Chubaryan:  
Using their power in Manchuria, Tsarist officials began extending their influence over 
Korea and gained forestry concessions along the Yalujian River. This upset Japan 
which had been building its colonial empire at the time and had placed Korea under a 
protectorate. The negotiations became futile.36 
 
Zagladin indicates that Russia gained a territorial concession, while Japan is depicted as merely 
assuming its rule over Korea. The text tells us neither Russia nor Japan were prepared to 
compromise – rendering the negotiations ‘futile’. Likewise, Andrei Levandovskii’s textbook 
sums up the outcome as: “diplomatic relations with Russia were broken.”37 The impersonal 
construction seems to serve two functions. First, it obfuscates the agency behind the events. 
Second, it seems to suggest that the event was inevitable. The result of diplomatic breakdown 
leads to a war as a natural and justifiable solution. Such obscurity leads to the absence of 
responsibility from the Russian side and potentially from Japan as well. The history evolves as 
a force of nature and not by human actions. Such narratives make it difficult to ask questions 
about ‘how’ these events happened as students are only provided with the ‘natural cause of 
history’ explanation to describe ‘what’ had occurred.  
 
 The 2010 edition of Vladimir Shestakov’s textbook begins with the unequivocal 
statement that both Russia and Japan were equally involved in the imperial race.38 Such an 
opening foreshadows the idea that both countries may share responsibility for the war. Further 
the textbook describes with some detail Russian economic developments in China and finally 
brings Japan into the picture by providing a geopolitical context.39 Bearing this geopolitical 
context in mind, it may be asked why a Japanese attack should be a surprise to Russia as 
Shestakov accentuates. He provides a possible explanation for such ignorance: 
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In Russia, Japan was never perceived as a strong enemy. The lack of clear information 
was due to the closed nature of Japanese society and as a result, nobody in St 
Petersburg believed war with Japan was possible until the very last moment. After 
unsuccessful negotiations with Japan’s ambassador, the Japanese suddenly attacked the 
Russian squadron in Port Arthur on the night of January 27, 1904. Nickolas the Second 
then declared through his Manifest the beginning of the war with Japan.40 
 
Russia never perceived Japan as a strong enemy. The textbook’s narrative shifts the 
responsibility from Russia to Japan as Japan was seemingly hiding something from Russia.  
Shestakov, similarly to other authors, does not identify who was responsible for the 
unsuccessful negotiations. However, the question does not hold much interest to us as finally 
Shestakov writes that Japanese troops suddenly attacked the Russian squadron in Port Arthur. 
Japan became the aggressor while Russia was the victim. Russian neglect about the situation in 
the Far East is concealed, which softens the damage to Russia’s self-image. The narrative 
incorporates both face protection techniques, saving the face of the Russian state, and an 
ideology of irresponsibility.  
 
Other textbooks also make short comments on geopolitics. “This nation [Japan] aspired 
to expand its political influence in Asia.”41 Furthermore: “In a very short time with the full 
support of the United Kingdom and Germany, Japan built a modern army and navy. At first 
Japan destroyed China (1894-1895) and then Russia was defeated (1904-1905).”42 Evgenii 
Sergeev, the author of the last textbook, downplays Japanese military success by accentuating 
the role of the United Kingdom and Germany. Hence, China was the first country that was 
destroyed by the Japanese and finally Russia was defeated. Such a sequence of sentences and 
the choice of vocabulary help to minimise the damage to Russia’s self-image. The use of a 
geopolitical background seems to bolster the notion that the beginning of the war was a 
foregone conclusion and that it was provoked by the Japanese.  
Oleg Soroko-Tsupa’s textbook states: “Japan attacked Russian the fleet in Port Arthur 
and Chemul’po (Korea) without a declaration of war.”43 The combination of ‘attacked’ and 
‘without a declaration of war’ seems to impregnate the text with animosity towards the 
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Japanese. Yet, it is unclear about the motive and the processes behind the Japanese attack. The 
2004 edition of Valerii Ostrovskii’s textbook follows Soroko-Tsupa’s:  
The historical fact is that Japan became the aggressor. Nearly a week before the 
Japanese attack on Russia, the Russian government sent an official note to the Japanese 
government that demonstrated Russia’s willingness to compromise and only suggested 
that Japan must not use Korea for its strategic interests.44 
 
The sequence of the sentences is noteworthy. The emphatic attribution of Japan as the 
aggressor is presented as an inviolable ‘historical fact’. The Japanese government is described 
as being unreasonable or contemptuous of the Russian request for compromise. Chubaryan’s 
textbook narrates: 
At night on the 26th of January, 1904, the Japanese fleet suddenly attacked the Russian 
squadron in Port Arthur. The first war of the Twentieth Century to involve Russia had 
begun.45 
 
These descriptions conjure up an image of Russia as a hapless victim of the unscrupulous 
Japanese. It also predisposes the reader to sympathise with the Russians while preparing them 
to be less surprised by Russia’s defeat.  
 
One common thread shared by all Russian textbooks is the absence of any information 
about Korean and Chinese interests, the ‘Man-Kan’ exchange, before and at the beginning of 
the war; even though the military actions comprising the conflict took place in the territories of 
these two countries.  
 
Comparison between Japanese and Russian textbooks  
The Russian textbooks devote more space than Japanese textbooks to the imperial ‘race’ and its 
aim of territorial expansion. They also present Japan as an aggressor and Russia as a victim of 
the developing geopolitical struggle in the Far East. The main message in the Japanese 
textbooks is the popular support and even popular demand for the war.  The Japanese textbooks 
are silent about the role of the state, shifting the responsibility for starting the war to the 
popular demand. Some Russian textbooks portray the incompetence of the Tsarist regime, 
which prepares the reader for Russian defeat and shifts responsibility for the loss from the 
Russian state. The Japanese textbooks seem to rely on impersonal constructions, suggesting 
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that war was inevitable. Russian textbooks also focus on states as main historical players while 
excluding human agency and thus obscuring the questions of responsibility further.  
  
The Course of Russo-Japanese War in Japanese Textbooks: Saving Japanese face and 
downplaying wartime killing 
The textbooks surveyed show contrasts in describing the ways Japan fought during the war. 
The textbooks identify how the Japanese troops occupied Manchurian territories and defeated 
the Russians. The 1997 edition of the Nihon Shoseki textbook relates:  
In 1905 the Japanese military occupied Lushun, and won battles around Mukden. The 
navy emphatically defeated the Russian Baltic fleet at the Battle of Tsushima. But 
Japan’s military expenditure was nearly ten times as much as that of the Sino-Japanese 
War; nearly 460,000 casualties resulted and weapons and ammunition ran short. The 
capacity of troops and finances were so weakened, it became difficult to carry on with 
the war.46 
 
The next edition published in 2002 says:  
The Japanese occupied Lushun, and won battles around Mukden. The navy 
comprehensively defeated the Russian Baltic fleet. […] But Japan’s military 
expenditure cost nearly nine times than that of the Sino-Japanese War; nearly 460,000 
casualties resulted.47 
 
The texts use emphatic terms to describe the Japanese victory as being comprehensive. While it 
is unreasonable to demand the textbooks list every single perpetrator and victim, the closest is 
‘Japan or the Japanese side producing deaths and injuries’. In contrast the unchanged excerpt 
from the 2002 and 2006 editions from Kyôiku Shuppan note that: 
The war against the major power, Russia, was difficult. But the Japanese military 
defeated the Russians, and advanced into south Manchuria. The Japanese fleet led by 
Togo Heihachiro comprehensively defeated the Russian fleet at the Battle of Tsushima. 
[…] The Japanese side, too, had many casualties […].48 
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The texts mention the large numbers of casualties on each nation so as to suggest neither nation 
should be blamed for being more brutal than the other. There is no mentioning of heroic 
victory in Japanese textbooks.  
 
The Course of Russo-Japanese War in Japanese Textbooks: Russian textbooks promote 
soldiers’ heroism and downplay Russian war losses 
A number of Russian textbooks exclude the descriptions of the war from the narrative 
completely.49 Other authors dedicate between a few lines and a maximum of six pages on the 
course of the war. The common thread in all textbooks, with only one exception of Michael 
Zuev’s textbook, is on accentuating the heroic characteristics of Russian sailors and soldiers.50 
Alexander Danilov’s textbook narrates:   
From the complete and devastating defeat Russia was rescued by the heroism and 
courage of the Russian soldier and sailor. The vessels ‘Varyag’ and ‘Koreets’ took part 
in an unequal battle with the Japanese fleet near the Korean city of Chemulpo which 
became a legend not only of Russian history. Russian heroes, even the prisoners of war, 
were paid homage even by their captors, who admired their bravery and loyalty to their 
military obligation….51 
 
By emphasising the Russians’ ‘loyalty to their military obligation’ Danilov diffuses 
humiliating defeat and praises the unnamed soldier, willing to sacrifice himself for his nation. 
Shestakov’s textbook elaborates: 
The Russo-Japanese war left in the public memory examples of the unprecedented 
bravery of Russian soldiers, seamen and officers. The seamen of ‘Varyag’ and ‘Koreets’ 
became symbols of faithfulness for their unequal fight near the Korean port 
Chemulpo.52 
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Boris Yakemenko’s textbook repeats the same theme: “The defence of Port-Arthur became the 
symbol of Russian resilience in this war”.53 So does Chibaryan’s: “In the course of the Russo-
Japanese war, Russian seamen and solders demonstrated heroism and self-sacrifice […].”54 
President Putin at the meeting with Russian historians at the Russian National Library 
in November 2003 declared that “textbooks should develop pride for its country and its history 
among Russian youth”.55 Putin consistently promotes the idea to create a historical memory 
and historical myth that glorifies the past. The extracts from the Russian textbooks show that 
these textbooks successfully meet the President’s challenge. 
The descriptions of battles are omitted by half of the surveyed Russian texts. However, 
the authors who have written about them acknowledge the Russian defeat in every one, and all 
authors state the total defeat of Russian troops in the war. Of all the textbooks, five of them 
provide some statistics on Russian and Japanese losses. Yet only Chubaryan provides the total 
Russian losses in the war: 
“The Small Victories War” cost Russia about 400 000 lives (including the injured and 
prisoners of war). This war substantially reduced Russian influence in the Far East and 
in the world generally.56 
 
The Japanese losses are not accounted for. A few authors contrast Russian and Japanese losses 
as:  
In August 1904 close to Liaoyang, the Japanese tried to surround and destroy the 
Russian army. The Russians showed incredible resilience and the Japanese lost 24 000 
solders against only 15 000 Russian losses.57 
 
The above extracts do not encourage any empathy towards the deceased on either side. And 
this is one of the characteristics of Russian textbooks, the lack of empathy to the human 
subjects generally. The main characteristic of Russian textbooks is the emphasis on heroism 
which glorifies trauma and constructs the idea or myth that even if the tsarist regime was 
incompetent, the ordinary soldiers were heroes who we can be proud of.  
 
 
Comparison between Japanese and Russian textbooks  
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Descriptions of military conflicts or wars are instrumental in constructing groups and national 
identities as they evoke emotional feelings – a very important element of historical memory. 
Hence, a number of scholars have analysed how ‘chosen glories’ and ‘chosen traumas,’ that 
become heavily mythologised over time, influence groups or national identity and impact on 
international relations.58 It is not difficult to agree that history education and textbooks 
contribute strongly to promoting patriotism. Narration of the Russo-Japanese war in Russian 
textbooks shifts the attention from the tragic cost on both sides to the heroism of Russian 
soldiers in spite of Russian losses. The ideology of patriotism found in Russian textbooks helps 
to develop ‘conscious citizens’ rather than ‘critically thinking individuals’ in spite of the earlier 
attempts of some educators and historians to emancipate history from ideology.59 Such 
narrative indicates a lost opportunity for understanding how the tragedy of war equally 
disadvantages both nations. This can hardly help Russo-Japanese reconciliation.  
In contrast with Russian textbooks, Japanese textbooks tend to mute the heroism of 
soldiers. The concealing of human brutality helps to protect the ‘faces’ of those responsible for 
those acts. However, face protecting ideology is only one part of the national narrative. 
Japanese textbooks tend to emphasise the hardship of Japanese population as a result of this 
war. The main didactic message is to promote pacifism and to show the brutality of the war 
while protecting the state.  
Conditions for troops and the domestic population inside Japan 
Unlike Russian textbooks, Japanese counterparts tell us how the war affected the conditions of 
the troops on battlefields and the living conditions of the Japanese people during the war. Two 
1997 textbooks provide the most detailed accounts:  
The strength of the troops and ammunition ran out while tax increases made the lives of 
the Japanese people difficult. Dissatisfaction amongst the Russian people increased 
during the war and with the news of their defeat. A revolutionary movement began to 
oppose the Tsarist regime, which made the war difficult to continue.60 
 
Continuing this theme, the Kyôiku Shuppan textbook says: 
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In Japan the national finances became tighter; Troops and materials ran short while 
standards of living also suffered. Although the course of the battles was advantageous, 
Japan could no longer afford to continue fighting.61 
 
These are but a few samples of constant messages in the Japanese textbooks surveyed. They 
emphasise the exacerbating domestic conditions. The texts do not identify the responsible 
individuals and organisations for these conditions. Rather, it is the people as a whole that 
suffered from these conditions as a result of demanding a war. While this interpretation can 
serve as a reminder for the Japanese people to honour pacifism, it also evades the question of 
who holds the ultimate responsibility. In the minds of many unsuspecting readers, the 
textbooks shift the responsibility to the state which remains beyond reproach as its mistakes lie 
beyond scrutiny.62  
  
The End of the War in Japanese textbooks: Popular reaction to the conclusion of the war 
The textbooks surveyed mention two outcomes of the war – the domestic response and Japan’s 
international standing. Tokyo Shoseki’s 1997 edition exemplifies the narrative trend: 
Despite the enormity of her sacrifices, Japan was unable to secure reparations and had 
to be content with gaining small territories and concessions. The people in Japan 
attacked the government fiercely and in Tokyo, a mass protest developed into rioting.63 
 
The excerpt indicates that substantial rewards were expected to compensate for all the 
suffering. But as it became clear that the gains were small, the public responded vociferously, 
even resorting to rioting. Likewise, the 1997 and 2002 editions by Kyôiku Shuppan also 
provide an example of the ideology of face protection:  
However, strong dissatisfaction with [the government’s failure in] securing reparations 
was expressed by the Japanese public, who had co-operated with the war effort and 
made large sacrifices. Many newspapers criticised the government and crowds shouting 
their opposition to the Peace Treaty attacked the residences of ministers, police stations, 
pro-government newspaper offices, and Christian churches.64 
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The mention of rioting serves as the denouement to the Pyrrhic victory. The focus on the 
adverse results of the war seems to buttress what the historian James Joseph Orr finds about 
post-1960s Japanese education’s aspiration to cultivate a peaceful-loving youth.65 The motive 
had already strongly appeared in the description of the war course. Two texts, both from the 
1997 round, give different motives to the popular sentiment: 
Japan was unable to gain reparations so frustration amongst the Japanese people, who 
had produced many victims and who had been troubled by tax increase, rose. In Tokyo 
crowds ransacked and burnt down newspaper offices and police stations.66 
 
And, 
Deaths and injuries had occurred to soldiers from towns and villages across the country. 
But many people were dissatisfied with a peace treaty that did not award reparations. In 
Tokyo, after a public meeting, attacked police stations, newspaper companies and 
Christian churches were attacked.67 
 
Kyôiku Shuppan’s 2006 edition notes that only a part of the crowd attacked:  
A national meeting opposing the treaty was held at Hibiya Park in Tokyo. Following 
the end, a part of the demonstrating crowd attacked government residences and police 
stations, and the newspapers that supported the treaty.68 
 
Fusôsha’s textbooks seem to be more direct: 
Japan was unable to gain reparations. But a group of people who did not know that the 
national capacity had reached its limit were dissatisfied and caused riots.69 
 
Contrary to this predominant trend of state-centric interpretation in textbooks Tokyo Shoseki’s 
2002 and 2006 editions add an extra sentence: “Furthermore, the enlargement of the military 
went ahead so the burden on the people did not become any lighter”.70 This phrase suggests the 
government channelled funds to the military, while ignoring social welfare programmes.   
The End of the War in Russian textbooks:  
The surveyed Russian textbooks present the end of the war in geopolitical contexts.  
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Levandovskii states:  
The strengthening of Japan in the Far East was not a part of the plan of Japan’s allies 
and particularly the USA. The American government took the role of the mediator in 
the peace negotiations in Portsmouth.71 
 
The power of making political decision about ending the war was taken away not just from 
Russia but equally from Japan. Moreover, Levandovskii displays quite a patronising attitude 
towards Japan as it was not Japan but Japan’s allies who made the important decision to end 
the war. Danilov narrates similarly:  
The USA was afraid that if Russia had lost to Japan, Japan could strengthen its position 
in the region. So the USA acted as the mediator in peace negotiations. England and 
France wished to see a weakened Russia, but at the same time did not want the war to 
continue.72  
 
The narrative signals that the main players in the region were the USA, England and France, 
who were preoccupied with their own geopolitical interests. Zuev provides an exception by 
referring to the Japanese conditions at the end of the war: 
In spite of the success in winning all the battles, Japan exhausted its material and 
human resources. This forced the Japanese government to seek peace with Russia. In 
May 1905 the USA, who was afraid that the rise of Japan in the Far East had the 
potential to undermine American interests in the region, initiated peace negotiations 
between Russia and Japan.73  
 
Zuev states that Japan was exhausted by war and recognises Japanese suffering, so the USA 
participation in the negotiation process is explained.  
The majority of authors concentrate on Russia’s ‘small’ victories. S. Y. Witte, who 
conducted negotiation for Russia, was able to gain reasonably good results in spite of 
the difficulties Russia had. Russia got off with minimal territorial losses – South 
Sakhalin and Port Arthur. However, S. Y. Witte managed to avoid paying reparations to 
Japan.74 
  
Chubaryan follows: 
According to the Portsmouth Treaty, Russia not only accepted the Japanese possession 
of Korea, but also gave South Sakhalin to Japan. Russia also agreed to concede to Japan 
the rights over the Liaodong Peninsula including Port Arthur. Only the diplomatic skills 
of the leader of the Russian delegation kept Russian losses to a minimum.75 
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The textbooks mitigate Russian losses with Witte’s diplomacy and focuses on the positive 
outcome for Russia. Finally, Russian textbooks convey a didactic lesson from the war. In 
Danilov’s words: 
Russia was not prepared for the war ideologically. Kuropatkin wrote: “The Japanese 
army was very patriotic, it received the support of the whole nation, every person in the 
army knew the importance of this war”. However, the Russian nation was not united in 
pursuit of victory […]. The losses caused by poor leadership caused disappointment 
and regrets. Such sentiments became the catalyst for the revolution of 1905-1907.76  
 
Danilov praises the Japanese army for its patriotic sentiments and emphasises the importance 
of national support to achieve victory. In contrast, the inability of Russian nation to unite at the 
time of war resulted not only in total Russian defeat but also caused the First Russian 
Revolution which aimed to change the tsarist regime. Assessing the significance of defeat 
Yakemenko notes:  
Despite some concessions gained by Russia during the negotiations [in Portsmouth] the 
war with Japan seriously damaged political stability in Russia. The defeat was 
perceived by the public as a national humiliation and resulted in the loss of confidence 
in government and monarchy.77 
 
Yakemenko links the war with the First Russian Revolution as the Russian defeat resulted in 
the loss of confidence in not only the Russian government, but also in the political system it 
represented. These concluding remarks reveal the need for a strong national leadership to win a 
war.   
   
Sergei Burin’s textbook further expands the didactic message by praising Japanese 
modernisation and at the same time warning about growing Japanese danger: 
The victory in the Russo-Japanese war marked the important first step in making Japan 
one of the most important economic and military empires in the East […]. The Japanese 
government skilfully modernised the nation and made the ascent to a new bourgeois 
society irreversible. While keeping much of its traditions Japan energetically copied 
Western innovations. At the same time, the militarisation of the Japanese economy 
created a potential for future Japanese aggression – which had already been experienced 
by its neighbours, China and Russia.78 
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By paying tribute to the Japanese state and the patriotism of Japanese nation the authors 
reinforce the central idea that a strong state can single-handedly guide the nation to victory. 
The main didactic message young Russian readers obtain from learning about the Russo-
Japanese war is that they should always support the state. Michael Apple and Linda Christian-
Smith in their study of history textbooks notice that textbooks are often used as “ideological 
tools to promote a certain belief system and legitimise an established political and social 
order”.79 Russian textbooks promote a strong sense of patriotism based on the glorification of 
Russian losses in Russo-Japanese War.  
 
Finally, the Russian loss of the South Sakhalin to Japan indicates that Japan creates a 
potential danger to Russia and that a future conflict between two countries is very real.    
 
Conclusion 
The analysis of the descriptions of the Russo-Japanese war from its outbreak to conclusion in 
44 Russian and Japanese history textbooks reveals their factual accuracy. The Russian 
textbooks, in a similar vein to their Japanese counterparts, seem to ascribe the intensifying 
rivalry between Japan and Russia as rooted in their respective imperialistic desires to expand 
their territories. Further commonality is the introduction of geopolitics at the beginning of the 
war in both sets of textbooks. However, the difference lies that in Russian textbooks 
geopolitics rests on European diplomacy while in Japanese textbooks geopolitics is based on 
the regional diplomacy of the ‘Man-Kan’ exchange.  
A further difference is that the Japanese state-centric interpretation rests on its aversion 
towards the populace. The textbooks attribute the beginning of the war to popular demand 
more than geopolitical considerations. Russian textbooks defend the Russian state by stressing 
Japanese belligerence in the emerging East Asian geopolitical arena. Russian textbooks also 
blame Japan for the “sudden attack” which reiterates the belief that this war should never have 
been won by Japan. Japanese textbooks do not say that the war happened suddenly but name 
the government’s response to public demands as the main cause. The common theme is that 
Japanese and Russian textbooks equally avert state responsibility for the war.   
																																								 																				
79 Michael W. Apple and Linda K. Christian-Smith, The Politics of the Textbook. (New York: Routledge, 1991), 
10. 
In the descriptions of the course of the war both Japanese and Russian textbooks 
acknowledge the enormity of casualties in both countries. The main difference is that Japanese 
textbooks focus on the hardship of the domestic populace implying the people would not have 
suffered if they had not demanded the war. At the same time they convey a pacifist message.  
Russian textbooks admit to defeat, but mitigate the humiliation by resorting to the heroism of 
its soldiers. This suits the present political agenda in Russia which reflects Putin’s perception 
that today’s Russia is in need of patriotic youth. The Japanese textbooks do not celebrate its 
military victories even if Japan emerged victorious. The casualties were too high for Japan, the 
war brought economic hardship, and possibly, the textbook’s authors are also trying to avoid 
any criticisms from the political left. However, the right-wing nationalists are not happy with 
the muted celebration either, which causes the motivation for Tsukurukai activities.  
Japanese and Russian textbooks equally acknowledge both countries ended the war by 
negotiation initiated by the American government. The difference is that Japanese textbooks 
expose the futility of public reaction to the peace treaty. Russian textbooks try to salvage 
national pride accentuating that the loss was not as bad as it could have been. A number of 
Russian textbooks convey a didactic message that Japanese victory was a result of 
public/national support for the war.  In contrast, the Russian nation was unable to unite (as they 
simply could not understand why Russians should fight in Manchuria) and lost. The didactic 
message in Russian textbooks is that the public has to be patriotic and support their state in 
order to win wars and avoid national humiliation. Japanese textbooks do not provide any 
explanation for Japanese victory or Russia’s loss except in Tsukurukai textbook.  
 
Russian and Japanese textbooks equally serve to strengthen the position of the state but 
use different narrative strategies to achieve this goal.  By comparing Russian and Japanese 
textbooks it often appears that they tell the story as if they were describing two different wars 
with relatively few areas of convergence; leaving the impression of ‘talking past each other’. 
Russian textbooks use the war to criticise the lack of domestic patriotism while Japanese 
textbooks blame the Japanese public for initiating the war. Russian textbooks promote the 
ideology of patriotism by constructing historical myth based on the bravery and heroism 
displayed by Russian soldiers and contrasting this with the incompetency of the Tsarist 
generals. Japanese textbooks accentuate pacifism and also diverge from the state responsibility 
for the war and especially casualties and the hardship the war brought to Japanese people. 
Nearly all Japanese textbooks, except the Tsukurukai textbook, forget to mention how this 
conflict transformed Japan from an ‘unknown’ and ‘unimportant’country, into a regional 
power.    
 
The analysis of the textbook’s ideologies in descriptions of the Russo-Japanese War 
reveals both countries equally have no empathy for each other. Textbooks do not contribute 
towards the development of transnational perspective or understanding that can assist with 
removing the suspicion between the two nations. The textbooks’ authors, preoccupied with the 
task of constructing historical memory to strengthen the position of the state, often neglect the 
opportunity to encourage critical thinking that may result in some state criticism. In Japanese 
textbooks this message is less evident as the narrative is more ‘neutral’ and charged with less 
emotional vocabulary than Russian texts. Russian textbooks boldly focus on glorifying war 
trauma. Reading such historical narratives in both countries naturally reproduce ambivalence 
and even suspicion towards each other.   
 In Japan the Tsukurukai stands out from the rest converting a more patriotic and 
nationalistic message about the importance of the importance of the victory in this war for the 
future of Japan. In Russia Zuev’s textbook conveys a more pacifist rather than just a patriotic 
message showing Russian and Japanese losses and sacrifices in the war. However, the rest of 
textbooks are quite homogenised in presenting the main ideologies.     
Referring to the three types of textbook genre described by Klerides and discussed in 
our introduction, Russian and Japanese examples demonstrate the characteristics of the 
traditional textbook. The debate about history education in both countries indicates there is an 
awareness of the existence, or at least the possibility of existence, of the new history textbooks. 
However, our analysis reveals that textbook authors in both countries neglect the opportunities 
offered by these different and more critical approaches.  
Despite of all the different challenges that Putin and Abe are currently facing, both of 
them try to restore national pride and rejuvenate the feeling of patriotism among their 
countrymen. This task is not much different from any other national leaders. Both of them refer 
to national history and history education with the hope to fulfil their ambitious plans. The 
comparative analyses of the one historic episode common for both countries, the Russo-
Japanese war, reveals that the narrative presented in Russian textbooks, although with slight 
variations, do assist with promoting the ideology of patriotism and national pride. While 
Japanese textbooks focus on averting state responsibility for the war and blaming the Japanese 
public for it. The result of such textbooks is that both nations continue talking past each other. 
	
